Deep Roots: The Political Legacy of Southern Slavery

Avi Acharya  Matt Blackwell  Maya Sen
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V.O. Key
Why southern exceptionalism?

- Why is the South politically distinct from the rest of America?
  - Economic institutions?
    - 250 years of chattel slavery
    - postbellum sharecropping and racial paternalism
    - black codes, lynching, and convict leasing
  - Political institutions?
    - Jim Crow disenfranchisement
    - one-party authoritarianism
- But these institutions have been gone for a while…

Points to the role of local political culture.
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Points to the role of local political culture.
Local political culture

- Institutions matter, but people matter too.
- Book project proposes a theory of behavioral path dependence:
  - Historical continuity of attitudes, values, beliefs, customs, etc.
  - Institutions and behaviors interact, but institutions can imprint on behavior that lasts for generations.
  - Nunn and Wantchekon (2011); Voigtländer and Voth (2012); Alesina and Fuchs-Schundeln (2007); Alesina, Giuliano and Nunn (2013); Dhar, Jain and Jayachandran (2014); Campante and Yanagizawa-Drott (2015).
- Beliefs/attitudes/values passed on by intergenerational socialization (Jennings and Niemi, 1974).
- Theoretical model (in another paper) formalizes some of the logic using imitation heuristics and cognitive dissonance.
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Our main results

1. Areas of U.S. South with more slaves in 1860 → whites more conservative today (especially on race)
2. Differences not due to contemporary factors such as demographics
3. Differences not entirely due to antebellum attitudes or migration
4. Partial answer in a theory of the historical persistence of attitudes → Specifically, postbellum political/economic incentives drove differences, then attitudes passed down over time
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Key data sources

• Share of population enslaved in a county in 1860 (Census)
• Need to account for shifting county boundaries
• Restrict our analysis to ex-Confederate States plus Kentucky and Missouri.
• Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (CCES)
  • Restrict to self-identified whites in Southern states
  • 39,000 respondents across 1,251 Southern counties (90% coverage), aggregated up to county level
  • Have done individual-level analyses w/ SEs clustered on county
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Key explanatory variable
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- 0-20%
- 21-40%
- 41-60%
- 61-80%
- 81-100%
Key outcome variables

1. Partisanship (self-identification with the Democratic Party, CCES)
2. Affirmative action (support or oppose, CCES)
3. Racial resentment question (5-point scale, CCES)
4. White vs. black thermometer scores (ANES, 1984-1998)
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Slavery predicts attitudes today
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Percentage of Whites that are Democrat, Today

Percentage Slave, 1860

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
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Percent of Whites that support Affirm. Action

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Percent of Whites that support Affirm. Action

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Racial Resentment

Percentage Slave, 1860

[Graph showing a relationship between percentage of slaves in 1860 and racial resentment]
Slavery predicts attitudes today

Racial Resentment vs. Percentage Slave, 1860
Slavery predicts attitudes today


Proportion Slave, 1860
Slavery predicts attitudes today

Results robust to various checks

• Controlling for various 1860 covariates
• Instrumenting slavery with cotton suitability
• Dropping urban counties
• Only using neighboring counties
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• Instrumenting slavery w/ cotton suitability
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Instrumental variables

- Unmeasured confounding between location of slavery and attitudes today always possible
- Alternative: use ecological measures of cotton suitability (U.N. FAO) as instrument for slavery
- 2SLS models only include geographic controls and state fixed effects
- We check the exclusion restriction with a falsification test in the Non-South
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IV results

Model 1: Baseline Results

Effect of Proportion Slave

Model 2: Instrumental variables

Effect on Proportion Democrat
What explains this link?

Discuss many in the book...

- Racial threat
- Antebellum attitudes
- Sorting
- Civil War destruction
- Rural-urban differences
- Inequality
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Results point to none of these completing explaining the results.
Slavery and its collapse as causal force

• Slavery and its collapse were critical junctures.
• After slavery, Southern whites faced massive changes to political, economic landscape.
• Emancipation huge shock.
• In theory and practice, blacks free to vote, take labor elsewhere.
• Posed severe problems for cotton economy, which relied heavily on cheap labor (Ransom and Sutch).
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Whites replaced slavery w/other institutions

• Specifically, political and economic responses involving violence/suppression
  ▶ Political: violence, poll taxes, literacy tests to disenfranchise
  ▶ Economic: vagrancy laws, peonage/convict leasing, paternalism
  • Aim: Keep black wages low, suppress mobility, increase labor output
• Mix of norms and institutions:
  ▶ Laws nominally race blind, but lawmakers were explicitly racist in their intentions
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- Can show more localized slavery in 1860 related to:
  - More support for early 20th century Southern state constitutions that created Jim Crow
  - More lynchings per capita during 1882-1930
  - Blacks less likely to own farms, lower farm values in 1925
  - Black-white wage inequality in 1940 (though not an explanation for contemporary attitudes)
  - More Voting Rights Act violations/lower black voter turnout (separate paper)

- White elite in the black belt subjugated blacks to maintain their status
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Why persistence?

• Differential black belt political and economic institutions largely erased by CRA, VRA, and mechanization.

• Why do we still these relationships today?

  Intergenerational socialization.

  ▶ Vertical transmission: parent-to-child.

    unnamed white woman (1904): “If anything would make me kill my children…it would be the possibility that n*****s might sometimes eat at the same table and associate with them as equals. That’s the way we feel about it.”

  ▶ Horizontal transmission: schools, churches, lynch mobs, etc.

  Southern history textbooks described slaves as inferior and happy to be mastered.

  Transmission most important in areas where the economic/political repression was most needed.
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WARNING: GRAPHIC CONTENT
Violence and transmission
Implication of economic incentive argument

• Suppose postbellum demand for cheap labor drives anti-black attitudes and intergeneration transfer involves some decay → areas with lower labor demands should see smaller effects.

• Partial mechanization of cotton begins in 1920s-30s, leads to lower labor requirements (Alston and Ferrie, 1993).

• In places that mechanized earlier → should see smaller effects.

▶ Exactly what we see empirically.
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Mechanization weakens slavery's impact

Model 1: Baseline Results

Effect of Proportion Slave

Model 2: Interaction with growth in tractors per acre, 1930-1940

Effect on Proportion Democrat
Mechanization weakens slavery’s impact

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Effect of Proportion Slave

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Effect of Proportion Slave, later mechanization

Effect on Proportion Democrat

-0.4  -0.2  0.0  0.2  0.4
Mechanization weakens slavery’s impact

Model 1: Baseline Results

Effect of Proportion Slave

Model 2: Interaction with growth in tractors per acre, 1930-1940

Effect of Proportion Slave, later mechanization

Effect of Proportion Slave, early mechanization

Effect on Proportion Democrat
Empirical conclusions

• Local presence of slavery in 1860 explains some variation in political attitudes within South today.
• Effects not simply due to antebellum attitudes, geographic sorting, contemporary factors (racial threat).
• Slavery appears to have direct effect on attitudes today thanks a mix of behavioral and institutional path dependence.
• Book project:
  ▶ Trace out the relationships from 1830s until today.
  ▶ Show attenuation in institutional relationships, not behavioral ones.
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  ▶ Trace out the relationships from 1830s until today.
  ▶ Show attenuation in institutional relationships, not behavioral ones.
Thanks!

For more information:

• Maya → http://scholar.harvard.edu/msen
• Avi → http://stanford.edu/~avidit/
• Matt → http://mattblackwell.org
Antebellum attitudes?

• Political differences between slaveholding and non-slaveholding areas preceded 1860?

• Racism co-evolved with slavery over time, this passed down

• Racially hostile attitudes preceded plantation economy, this passed down

• Well developed historical literature – Jordan (1968), Foner (2011)

• For our purposes: Effect of slavery on historical Presidential vote shares → suggest post-bellum pattern
Antebellum attitudes?

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Antebellum attitudes?

- Civil War Begins
- Reconstruction Ends
- All states but KY have enacted poll taxes
- Voting Rights Act
Antebellum attitudes?

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- Reconstruction Ends
- All states but KY have enacted poll taxes
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Year: 1850 1900 1950 2000

Effect of Slavery on % Democrat

-10 0 10 20 30
Antebellum attitudes?

- All states but KY have enacted poll taxes
- Voting Rights Act
- Civil War Begins
- Civil War Ends
- Reconstruction Begins
- Reconstruction Ends
- Thurmond 1948
- Wallace 1968

Effect of Slavery on % Democrat

Year:
- 1850
- 1900
- 1950
- 2000
Antebellum attitudes?

1850 1900 1950 2000

Year

Effect of Slavery on % Democrat

All states but KY have enacted poll taxes

Voting Rights Act

Civil War Begins

Reconstruction Ends

Wallace 1968

Thurmond 1948

Obama 2008
Geographic sorting?

• Possible people moving around over 20th century causes patterns
  • (1) Racially liberal whites leave former slave areas
  • (2) Racially conservatives whites move to former slave areas
  • Evidence on these points difficult to come by
Geographic sorting?

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Evidence from 1940 Census

1940 U.S. Census recorded county of residence in 1935 and 1940
Can exploit this to see how white patterns of migration differed between high-slave and low-slave areas

Design from Hornbeck (working paper):
▶ Regress census traits on migrant status interacted with proportion slave in 1935 or 1940 county of residence, separately
▶ Are out-migrants different than those they left behind?
▶ Are in-migrants different than those they joined?
▶ Do these patterns differ by prop. slave in the county left or joined?
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  - Are in-migrants different than those they joined?
  - Do these patterns differ by prop. slave in the county left or joined?
1935-1940 Migration Patterns

In-migration vs. Non-migrants

- High Prop Slave
- Low Prop Slave

Variables:
- Monthly Rent
- Wages
- Weeks Worked
- Living in birthstate
- Nativity
- Female
- Age
- Education
Evidence from 1940 Census

• Migrants very different from non-migrants
• But: Migration patterns roughly similar across the slavery distribution
• Some additional evidence from 1995-2000 from 2000 Census
  ▶ Most migration from (a) low-slave to low-slave areas, (b) high-slave to high-slave areas
  ▶ Not across (which would be necessary)
  → Sorting hard to dismiss, but if anything causing classical measurement error
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(1) Slavery $\rightarrow$ Electoral Challenges
(1) Slavery → Electoral Challenges

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Electoral Challenges per 100k Residents</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prop. Slave, 1860</td>
<td>3.152***</td>
<td>3.158***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.512)</td>
<td>(1.053)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1860 Covariates</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Fixed Effects</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model</td>
<td>OLS</td>
<td>OLS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>772</td>
<td>434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.128</td>
<td>0.149</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01
(2) Slavery → Lower Black Voter Turnout
(2) Slavery → Lower Black Voter Turnout

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Turnout</th>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Blacks</td>
<td>Whites</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prop. Slave, 1860</td>
<td>-2.901***</td>
<td>-0.064</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.121)</td>
<td>(0.353)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1860 Covariates</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Fixed Effects</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>521</td>
<td>4,255</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>518.353</td>
<td>4,297.104</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01
(3) Slavery $\longrightarrow$ Higher Racial Polarization
# (3) Slavery → Higher Racial Polarization

## Democratic Identification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Blacks</th>
<th>Whites</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prop. Slave, 1860</td>
<td>0.619 (0.396)</td>
<td>-0.698*** (0.207)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1860 Covariates</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Fixed Effects</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>5,030</td>
<td>23,714</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>4,962.651</td>
<td>29,586.690</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01
## Baseline specification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prop. Slave, 1860</td>
<td>-0.187**</td>
<td>-0.159**</td>
<td>0.554**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td>(0.044)</td>
<td>(0.196)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Fixed Effects</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1860 Covariates</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1,214</td>
<td>748</td>
<td>643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.046</td>
<td>0.188</td>
<td>0.114</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .05; **p < .01
**Baseline specification (individual level)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Prop Democrat</th>
<th>Affirm. Action</th>
<th>Racial Resentment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>logistic</td>
<td>logistic</td>
<td>OLS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prop. Slave, 1860</td>
<td>(-0.698^{**})</td>
<td>(-0.672^{**})</td>
<td>(-0.572^{**})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>((0.207))</td>
<td>((0.205))</td>
<td>((0.205))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>19.583</td>
<td>18.586</td>
<td>25.138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>((15.941))</td>
<td>((16.043))</td>
<td>((16.871))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Fixed Effects</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cluster-Robust SEs</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1860 Covariates</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual Covariates</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>23,714</td>
<td>22,686</td>
<td>23,673</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>r²</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.052</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*\(\dagger \) p < .1; * p < .05; ** p < .01*
Results on Slaveholders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th>Racial Resentment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prop. Slave, 1860</td>
<td>−0.163*</td>
<td>−0.175**</td>
<td>−0.104†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.067)</td>
<td>(0.052)</td>
<td>(0.060)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prop Slave, 1830</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>−0.083</td>
<td>0.032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.059)</td>
<td>(0.053)</td>
<td>(0.234)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prop Slaveholder, 1860</td>
<td>0.991†</td>
<td>0.280</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.591)</td>
<td>(0.509)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Fixed Effects</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1860 Covariates</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>456</td>
<td>769</td>
<td>456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.236</td>
<td>0.181</td>
<td>0.159</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: † p < .1; * p < .05; ** p < .01. All models are WLS with within-county sample size as weights. Proportion slaveholder is the total slaveholders in a county divided by the total county population.
## Instrumental variable results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Prop Slave (1)</th>
<th>Prop Democrat (2)</th>
<th>Affirm. Action (3)</th>
<th>Racial Resentment (4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cotton Suitability</td>
<td>0.381** (0.027)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prop. Slave, 1860</td>
<td></td>
<td>−0.198** (0.075)</td>
<td>−0.168** (0.063)</td>
<td>0.512 (0.360)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Fixed Effects</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latitude/Longitude</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1,206</td>
<td>1,206</td>
<td>1,206</td>
<td>1,016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.447</td>
<td>0.174</td>
<td>0.077</td>
<td>0.045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model</td>
<td>2SLS 1st Stage</td>
<td>2SLS 2nd Stage</td>
<td>2SLS 2nd Stage</td>
<td>2SLS 2nd Stage</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p < .05; ** p < .01

Column (1) is 1st stage relationship, Columns (2)-(4) 2nd stage
Does exclusion restriction hold?

- Cotton suitability could affect political beliefs via other mechanisms
- Falsification test (Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011): Exclusion violated if evidence of cotton-attitudes relationship in areas w/no legal slavery
- → Examine if effect of IV on attitudes outside South
Falsification test

Reduced Form in the South

Effect on Proportion Democrat

Effect on Proportion Democrat
Falsification test

Reduced Form in the South

Effect of Cotton Suitability

Effect on Proportion Democrat
Falsification test

Reduced Form in the South

Effect of Cotton Suitability

Reduced Form in the North

Effect on Proportion Democrat

Effect on Proportion Democrat
Falsification test

Effect on Proportion Democrat
Reduced Form in the South
Effect of Cotton Suitability

Reduced Form in the North
Effect of Cotton Suitability
North-South counterfactual analysis

- Is fact that slavery legal driving effect? Or is localized high/low prevalence driving effect?
- Test to compare:
  - Northern counties (slavery illegal by 1860)
  - Southern counties w/ very low % enslaved
North-South counterfactual analysis
North-South counterfactual analysis

Campbell County, KY
Prop Slave = 0.006
North-South counterfactual analysis

Campbell County, KY
Prop Slave = 0.006

Adams County, OH
No Legal Slavery

if different, then legality of institution driving the difference
North-South counterfactual analysis

if different, then legality of institution driving the difference

Adams County, OH
No Legal Slavery

Campbell County, KY
Prop Slave = 0.006
North-South counterfactual analysis

• Match Southern counties w/ few slaves (< 3% of the pop) to Northern counties w/ no slaves on
  ▶ geography (latitude/longitude/area)
  ▶ farm value per capita, and
  ▶ total county population

• Use coarsened exact matching w/ default cut-points

• 181 matched counties left

• Regress each outcome measure on North-South dummy
North-South counterfactual analysis

Model 1: Baseline Results

Effect of Proportion Slave

Model 2: Instrumental variables

Effect of Proportion Slave

Model 3: North-South Matching

Effect on Affirmative Action Support
North-South counterfactual analysis

Model 1: Baseline Results

Effect of Proportion Slave

Model 2: Instrumental variables

Effect of Proportion Slave

Model 3: North-South Matching

South-North Difference

Effect on Affirmative Action Support
Other political attitudes

Prop. Democrat

Effect of Slavery

Raw
Within States + 1860
Controls
Neighbors
IV

Racial Resentment

Raw Within States + 1860 Controls
Neighbors
IV

Affirm. Action
Other political attitudes

- Jobs vs. Environment
- Gay Marriage Ban
- Pro-choice

Diagram showing the effect of slavery on political attitudes with variables such as Raw, Within States, + 1860 Controls, and Neighbors.
Sequential g-estimation procedure (Vansteelandt, 2009):

1. Regress attitudes on % black today, % slave 1860, and any confounders for % black today

\[ Y_c = \alpha_s + \beta_1 PB_{c,2000} + \beta_2 PS_{c,1860} + X_c \beta_3 + \varepsilon_c \]

2. Adjust outcome by subtracting estimated effect of % black

\[ \tilde{Y}_c = Y_c - \hat{\beta}_1 PB_{c,2000} \]

3. Regress adjusted outcome on % slave without any post-treatment variables

\[ \tilde{Y}_c = \alpha_s + \gamma_1 PS_{c,1860} + X_{c,1860} \gamma_2 + \nu_c \]

Under no omitted variables at each stage (and homogeneous effects), \( \gamma_2 \) is controlled direct effect of slavery.
## Racial threat results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prop. Slave, Direct Effect</td>
<td>$-0.175^{**}$</td>
<td>$-0.159^{**}$</td>
<td>$-0.143^{**}$</td>
<td>$-0.129^{**}$</td>
<td>$0.571^{**}$</td>
<td>$0.541^{**}$</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.044)</td>
<td>(0.044)</td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
<td>(0.196)</td>
<td>(0.196)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prop. Black, 2000</td>
<td>$0.167^{**}$</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td></td>
<td>$-0.241$</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.049)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.043)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.214)</td>
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</tr>
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<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td>1860 Covariates</td>
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<td>748</td>
<td>748</td>
<td>643</td>
<td>643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.200</td>
<td>0.187</td>
<td>0.136</td>
<td>0.118</td>
<td>0.116</td>
<td>0.111</td>
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<tr>
<td>Model</td>
<td>WLS</td>
<td>Seq. g-est.</td>
<td>WLS</td>
<td>Seq. g-est.</td>
<td>WLS</td>
<td>Seq. g-est.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**p < .05; ***p < .01

Columns (1), (3), and (5) include % black 2000 as an additional control to the baseline specification. Columns (2), (4), and (6) use sequential g-estimation of Vansteelandt (2009).
## Antebellum attitudes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Prop Democrat</th>
<th>Affirm. Action</th>
<th>Racial Resentment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prop. Slave, 1860</td>
<td>−0.198†</td>
<td>−0.186**</td>
<td>−0.096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.116)</td>
<td>(0.052)</td>
<td>(0.102)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prop. Slave, 1850</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>−0.163</td>
<td>−0.118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.115)</td>
<td>(0.101)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prop Slave 1840</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>0.100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.113)</td>
<td>(0.099)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prop Slaveholder, 1860</td>
<td>0.557</td>
<td>0.307</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.576)</td>
<td>(0.495)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Fixed Effects</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1860 Covariates</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>566</td>
<td>748</td>
<td>566</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.213</td>
<td>0.189</td>
<td>0.148</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

† p < .1; * p < .05; ** p < .01
# Children of immigrants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prop Democrat logistic</th>
<th>Affirm. Action logistic</th>
<th>Racial Resentment OLS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prop. Slave, 1860</td>
<td>0.619</td>
<td>−0.714</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.396)</td>
<td>(0.533)</td>
<td>(0.462)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1860 Covariates</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cluster-Robust SEs</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample</td>
<td>Blacks</td>
<td>2nd Gen. Immigrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>5,030</td>
<td>1,886</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .1; **p < .05

Effect of slavery on African Americans (Columns 1, 3, and 5) and children of immigrants (Columns 2, 4, 6) in South.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Prop Democrat</th>
<th></th>
<th>Affirm. Action</th>
<th></th>
<th>Racial Resentment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prop. Slave, 1860</td>
<td>$-0.196^{**}$</td>
<td>$-0.165^{**}$</td>
<td>$-0.157^{**}$</td>
<td>$-0.143^{**}$</td>
<td>$0.487^{†}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.057)</td>
<td>(0.044)</td>
<td>(0.049)</td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
<td>(0.251)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil War Destruction</td>
<td>$-0.005$</td>
<td>$-0.005$</td>
<td>$0.056$</td>
<td>$0.007$</td>
<td>$0.056$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Fixed Effects</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1860 Covariates</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Counties Only</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>565</td>
<td>747</td>
<td>565</td>
<td>747</td>
<td>471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.168</td>
<td>0.191</td>
<td>0.156</td>
<td>0.140</td>
<td>0.125</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$^{†} p < .1; ^{*} p < .05; ^{**} p < .01$

Effect of slavery after eliminating large urban centers (Columns 1, 3, 5) and controlling for Civil War destruction (Columns 2, 4, 6), which are % decrease in farm value in county between 1860 and 1870.
### Postbellum patterns

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Lynchings (1)</th>
<th>Prop Democrat (2)</th>
<th>Affirm. Action (3)</th>
<th>Racial Resentment (4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prop. Slave, 1860</td>
<td>16.618**</td>
<td>-0.235**</td>
<td>-0.213**</td>
<td>0.829**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.537)</td>
<td>(0.053)</td>
<td>(0.045)</td>
<td>(0.235)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractors Change, 1930-1940</td>
<td>-0.483†</td>
<td>-0.616†</td>
<td>2.198†</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.289)</td>
<td>(0.248)</td>
<td>(1.264)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractors, 1930</td>
<td>-0.197</td>
<td>-0.112</td>
<td>0.191</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.179)</td>
<td>(0.154)</td>
<td>(0.777)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prop Slave × Tractors Change</td>
<td>2.303*</td>
<td>2.179**</td>
<td>-9.094*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.942)</td>
<td>(0.809)</td>
<td>(4.229)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **State Fixed Effects**: ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
- **1860 Covariates**: ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N</th>
<th>748</th>
<th>748</th>
<th>748</th>
<th>643</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.371</td>
<td>0.197</td>
<td>0.145</td>
<td>0.121</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specification</th>
<th>WLS-county area</th>
<th>WLS-sample size</th>
<th>WLS-sample size</th>
<th>WLS-sample size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **† p < .1; * p < .05; ** p < .01**

Black lynchings per 100,000 blacks 1882–1930, number of tractors per 100,000 acres of land in 1940. Column 1 is WLS w/ log of total county area as weights.


