Deep Roots: The Political Legacy of Southern Slavery

Avi Acharya

Matt Blackwell

Maya Sen



No.	States	Free Population.	Slave Population.	Total.	Percentage of Slaves.
1	South Carolina	301,271	402,541	703,812	57.2
2	Mississippi	354,700	436,696	791,396	55.1
3	Louisiana	376,280	333,010	709,290	47.0
4	Alabama	529,164	435,132	964,296	45.1
5	Florida	78,686	61,753	140,439	43.9
6	Georgia	595,097	462,332	1,057,329	43.7
7	North Carolina	661,586	331,081	992,667	33.4
8	Virginia	1,105,192	490,887	1,596,079	30.7
9	Texas	421,750	180,682	602,432	30.0
10	Arkansas	324,323	111,104	435,427	25.5
11	Tennessee	834,063	275,784	1,109,847	24.6
12	Kentucky	930,223	225,490	1,155,713	19.5
13	Maryland	599,846	87,188	687,034	12.7
14	Missouri	1,067,352	114,965	1,182,317	9.7
15	Delaware	110,420	1,798	112,218	1.6
		8,269,953	3,950,343	12,240,296	32.2

V.O. Key

It is "the whites of the black belts who have the deepest and most immediate concern about the maintenance of white supremacy...if the politics of the South revolves around any single theme, it is that of the role of the black belts."

V.O. Key

Why southern exceptionalism?

Why southern exceptionalism?

- Why is the South politically distinct from the rest of America?

Why southern exceptionalism?

- Why is the South politically distinct from the rest of America?
- Economic institutions?

Why southern exceptionalism?

- Why is the South politically distinct from the rest of America?
- Economic institutions?
  - 250 years of chattel slavery

Why southern exceptionalism?

- Why is the South politically distinct from the rest of America?
- Economic institutions?
  - 250 years of chattel slavery
  - postbellum sharecropping and racial paternalism

Why southern exceptionalism?

- Why is the South politically distinct from the rest of America?
- Economic institutions?
  - 250 years of chattel slavery
  - postbellum sharecropping and racial paternalism
  - black codes, lynching, and convict leasing

Why southern exceptionalism?

- Why is the South politically distinct from the rest of America?
- Economic institutions?
  - 250 years of chattel slavery
  - postbellum sharecropping and racial paternalism
  - black codes, lynching, and convict leasing
- Political institutions?

Why southern exceptionalism?

- Why is the South politically distinct from the rest of America?
- Economic institutions?
  - 250 years of chattel slavery
  - postbellum sharecropping and racial paternalism
  - black codes, lynching, and convict leasing
- Political institutions?
  - Jim Crow disenfranchisement

Why southern exceptionalism?

- Why is the South politically distinct from the rest of America?
- Economic institutions?
  - 250 years of chattel slavery
  - postbellum sharecropping and racial paternalism
  - black codes, lynching, and convict leasing
- Political institutions?
  - Jim Crow disenfranchisement
  - one-party authoritarianism

Why southern exceptionalism?

- Why is the South politically distinct from the rest of America?
- Economic institutions?
  - 250 years of chattel slavery
  - postbellum sharecropping and racial paternalism
  - black codes, lynching, and convict leasing
- Political institutions?
  - Jim Crow disenfranchisement
  - one-party authoritarianism
- But these institutions have been gone for a while…

Why southern exceptionalism?

- Why is the South politically distinct from the rest of America?
- Economic institutions?
  - 250 years of chattel slavery
  - postbellum sharecropping and racial paternalism
  - black codes, lynching, and convict leasing
- Political institutions?
  - Jim Crow disenfranchisement
  - one-party authoritarianism
- But these institutions have been gone for a while…
- Points to the role of local political culture.

Local political culture

Local political culture

- Institutions matter, but people matter too.

Local political culture

- Institutions matter, but people matter too.
- Book project proposes a theory of behavioral path dependence:

Local political culture

- Institutions matter, but people matter too.
- Book project proposes a theory of behavioral path dependence:
  - Historical continuity of attitudes, values, beliefs, customs, etc.

Local political culture

- Institutions matter, but people matter too.
- Book project proposes a theory of behavioral path dependence:
  - Historical continuity of attitudes, values, beliefs, customs, etc.
- Institutions and behaviors interact, but institutions can imprint on behavior that lasts for generations

Local political culture

- Institutions matter, but people matter too.
- Book project proposes a theory of behavioral path dependence:
  - Historical continuity of attitudes, values, beliefs, customs, etc.
- Institutions and behaviors interact, but institutions can imprint on behavior that lasts for generations
  - Nunn and Wantchekon (2011); Voigtländer and Voth (2012); Alesina and Fuchs-Schundeln (2007); Alesina, Giuliano and Nunn (2013); Dhar, Jain and Jayachandran (2014); Campante and Yanagizawa-Drott (2015)

Local political culture

- Institutions matter, but people matter too.
- Book project proposes a theory of behavioral path dependence:
  - Historical continuity of attitudes, values, beliefs, customs, etc.
- Institutions and behaviors interact, but institutions can imprint on behavior that lasts for generations
  - Nunn and Wantchekon (2011); Voigtländer and Voth (2012); Alesina and Fuchs-Schundeln (2007); Alesina, Giuliano and Nunn (2013); Dhar, Jain and Jayachandran (2014); Campante and Yanagizawa-Drott (2015)
- Beliefs/attitudes/values passed on by intergenerational socialization (Jennings and Niemi, 1974).

Local political culture

- Institutions matter, but people matter too.
- Book project proposes a theory of behavioral path dependence:
  - Historical continuity of attitudes, values, beliefs, customs, etc.
- Institutions and behaviors interact, but institutions can imprint on behavior that lasts for generations
  - Nunn and Wantchekon (2011); Voigtländer and Voth (2012); Alesina and Fuchs-Schundeln (2007); Alesina, Giuliano and Nunn (2013); Dhar, Jain and Jayachandran (2014); Campante and Yanagizawa-Drott (2015)
- Beliefs/attitudes/values passed on by intergenerational socialization (Jennings and Niemi, 1974).
- Theoretical model (in another paper) formalizes some of the logic using imitation heuristics and cognitive dissonance.

Our main results

Our main results

Southern exceptionalism somewhat driven by the persistent local political culture of the Black Belts:

Our main results

Southern exceptionalism somewhat driven by the persistent local political culture of the Black Belts:

1. Areas of U.S. South w/ more slaves in 1860 $\rightarrow$ whites more conservative today (especially on race)

Our main results

Southern exceptionalism somewhat driven by the persistent local political culture of the Black Belts:

1. Areas of U.S. South w/ more slaves in 1860 $\rightarrow$ whites more conservative today (especially on race)
2. Differences not due to contemporary factors such as demographics or inequality

Our main results

Southern exceptionalism somewhat driven by the persistent local political culture of the Black Belts:

1. Areas of U.S. South w/ more slaves in 1860 $\rightarrow$ whites more conservative today (especially on race)
2. Differences not due to contemporary factors such as demographics or inequality
3. Differences not entirely due to antebellum attitudes or migration

Our main results

Southern exceptionalism somewhat driven by the persistent local political culture of the Black Belts:

1. Areas of U.S. South w/ more slaves in 1860 → whites more conservative today (especially on race)
2. Differences not due to contemporary factors such as demographics or inequality
3. Differences not entirely due to antebellum attitudes or migration
4. Partial answer in a theory of the historical persistence of attitudes

Our main results

Southern exceptionalism somewhat driven by the persistent local political culture of the Black Belts:

1. Areas of U.S. South w/ more slaves in 1860 → whites more conservative today (especially on race)
2. Differences not due to contemporary factors such as demographics or inequality
3. Differences not entirely due to antebellum attitudes or migration
4. Partial answer in a theory of the historical persistence of attitudes → Specifically, postbellum political/economic incentives drove differences, then attitudes passed down over time

Key data sources

Key data sources

- Share of population enslaved in a county in 1860 (Census)

Key data sources

- Share of population enslaved in a county in 1860 (Census)
- Need to account for shifting county boundaries

Key data sources

- Share of population enslaved in a county in 1860 (Census)
- Need to account for shifting county boundaries
- Restrict our analysis to ex-Confederate States plus Kentucky and Missouri.

Key data sources

- Share of population enslaved in a county in 1860 (Census)
- Need to account for shifting county boundaries
- Restrict our analysis to ex-Confederate States plus Kentucky and Missouri.
- Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (CCES)

Key data sources

- Share of population enslaved in a county in 1860 (Census)
- Need to account for shifting county boundaries
- Restrict our analysis to ex-Confederate States plus Kentucky and Missouri.
- Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (CCES)
  - 2006, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 surveys

Key data sources

- Share of population enslaved in a county in 1860 (Census)
- Need to account for shifting county boundaries
- Restrict our analysis to ex-Confederate States plus Kentucky and Missouri.
- Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (CCES)
  - 2006, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 surveys
  - Restrict to self-identified whites in Southern states

Key data sources

- Share of population enslaved in a county in 1860 (Census)
- Need to account for shifting county boundaries
- Restrict our analysis to ex-Confederate States plus Kentucky and Missouri.
- Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (CCES)
  - 2006, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 surveys
  - Restrict to self-identified whites in Southern states
  - 39,000 respondents across 1,251 Southern counties (90% coverage), aggregated up to county level

Key data sources

- Share of population enslaved in a county in 1860 (Census)
- Need to account for shifting county boundaries
- Restrict our analysis to ex-Confederate States plus Kentucky and Missouri.
- Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (CCES)
  - 2006, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 surveys
  - Restrict to self-identified whites in Southern states
  - 39,000 respondents across 1,251 Southern counties (90% coverage), aggregated up to county level
  - Have done individual-level analyses w/ SEs clustered on county

Key explanatory variable

Key explanatory variable



Key outcome variables

Key outcome variables

1. Partisanship (self-identification w/ Democratic Party, CCES)

Key outcome variables

1. Partisanship (self-identification w/ Democratic Party, CCES)
2. Affirmative action (support or oppose, CCES)

Key outcome variables

1. Partisanship (self-identification w/ Democratic Party, CCES)
2. Affirmative action (support or oppose, CCES)
3. Racial resentment question (5 point scale, CCES)

Key outcome variables

1. Partisanship (self-identification w/ Democratic Party, CCES)
2. Affirmative action (support or oppose, CCES)
3. Racial resentment question (5 point scale, CCES)
4. White vs. black thermometer scores (ANES, 1984-1998)

Slavery predicts attitudes today

Slavery predicts attitudes today



Slavery predicts attitudes today



Slavery predicts attitudes today



Slavery predicts attitudes today



Slavery predicts attitudes today



Slavery predicts attitudes today



Slavery predicts attitudes today



Slavery predicts attitudes today



Results robust to various checks

Results robust to various checks

- Controling for various 1860 covariates

Results robust to various checks

- Controling for various 1860 covariates
- Instrumenting slavery w/ cotton suitability

Results robust to various checks

- Controling for various 1860 covariates
- Instrumenting slavery w/ cotton suitability
- Dropping urban counties

Results robust to various checks

- Controling for various 1860 covariates
- Instrumenting slavery w/ cotton suitability
- Dropping urban counties
- Only using neighboring counties

Instrumental variables

Instrumental variables

- Unmeasured confounding between location of slavery and attitudes today always possible

Instrumental variables

- Unmeasured confounding between location of slavery and attitudes today always possible
- Alternative: use ecological measures of cotton suitability (U.N. FAO) as instrument for slavery

Instrumental variables

- Unmeasured confounding between location of slavery and attitudes today always possible
- Alternative: use ecological measures of cotton suitability (U.N. FAO) as instrument for slavery
- 2SLS models only include geographic controls and state fixed effects

Instrumental variables

- Unmeasured confounding between location of slavery and attitudes today always possible
- Alternative: use ecological measures of cotton suitability (U.N. FAO) as instrument for slavery
- 2SLS models only include geographic controls and state fixed effects
- We check the exclusion restriction with a falsification test in the Non-South.

IV results


Model 1: Baseline Results
Effect of Proportion Slave
-0.4
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
Effect on Proportion Democrat

IV results


Model 1: Baseline Results
Effect of Proportion Slave
Model 2: Instrumental variables
-0.4
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
Effect on Proportion Democrat

IV results


Model 1: Baseline Results
Effect of Proportion Slave
Model 2: Instrumental variables
Effect of Proportion Slave
-0.4
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
Effect on Proportion Democrat

What explains this link?

Discuss many in the book...

- Racial threat
- Antebellum attitudes
- Sorting
- Civil War destruction
- Rural-urban differences
- Inequality

What explains this link?

Discuss many in the book...

- Racial threat
- Antebellum attitudes
- Sorting
- Civil War destruction
- Rural-urban differences
- Inequality

Results point to none of these completing explaining the results.

Slavery and its collapse as causal force

Slavery and its collapse as causal force

- Slavery and its collapse were critical junctures

Slavery and its collapse as causal force

- Slavery and its collapse were critical junctures
- After slavery, Southern whites faced massive changes to political, economic landscape

Slavery and its collapse as causal force

- Slavery and its collapse were critical junctures
- After slavery, Southern whites faced massive changes to political, economic landscape
- Emancipation huge shock

Slavery and its collapse as causal force

- Slavery and its collapse were critical junctures
- After slavery, Southern whites faced massive changes to political, economic landscape
- Emancipation huge shock
- In theory and practice, blacks free to vote, take labor elsewhere

Slavery and its collapse as causal force

- Slavery and its collapse were critical junctures
- After slavery, Southern whites faced massive changes to political, economic landscape
- Emancipation huge shock
- In theory and practice, blacks free to vote, take labor elsewhere
- Posed severe problems for cotton economy, which relied heavily on cheap labor (Ransom and Sutch)



W.E.B. DuBois



W.E.B. DuBois

"If all labor, black as well as white, became free – were given schools and the right to vote – how would property and privileged be protected?"

Whites replaced slavery w/other institutions

Whites replaced slavery w/other institutions

- Specifically, political and economic responses involving for violence/suppression

Whites replaced slavery w/other institutions

- Specifically, political and economic responses involving for violence/suppression
  - Political: violence, poll taxes, literacy tests to disenfranchise

Whites replaced slavery w/other institutions

- Specifically, political and economic responses involving for violence/suppression
  - Political: violence, poll taxes, literacy tests to disenfranchise
  - Economic: vagrancy laws, peonage/convict leasing, paternalism

Whites replaced slavery w/other institutions

- Specifically, political and economic responses involving for violence/suppression
  - Political: violence, poll taxes, literacy tests to disenfranchise
  - Economic: vagrancy laws, peonage/convict leasing, paternalism
- Aim: Keep black wages low, suppress mobility, increase labor output

Whites replaced slavery w/other institutions

- Specifically, political and economic responses involving for violence/suppression
  - Political: violence, poll taxes, literacy tests to disenfranchise
  - Economic: vagrancy laws, peonage/convict leasing, paternalism
- Aim: Keep black wages low, suppress mobility, increase labor output
- Mix of norms and institutions:

Whites replaced slavery w/other institutions

- Specifically, political and economic responses involving for violence/suppression
  - Political: violence, poll taxes, literacy tests to disenfranchise
  - Economic: vagrancy laws, peonage/convict leasing, paternalism
- Aim: Keep black wages low, suppress mobility, increase labor output
- Mix of norms and institutions:
  - Laws nominally race blind, but lawmakers were explicitly racist in their intentions

Evidence slavery leads to coercive acts

Evidence slavery leads to coercive acts

- Can show more localized slavery in 1860 related to:

Evidence slavery leads to coercive acts

- Can show more localized slavery in 1860 related to:
  - More support for early 20th century Southern state constitutions that created Jim Crow

Evidence slavery leads to coercive acts

- Can show more localized slavery in 1860 related to:
  - More support for early 20th century Southern state constitutions that created Jim Crow
  - More lynchings per capita during 1882-1930

Evidence slavery leads to coercive acts

- Can show more localized slavery in 1860 related to:
  - More support for early 20th century Southern state constitutions that created Jim Crow
  - More lynchings per capita during 1882-1930
  - Blacks less likely to own farms, lower farm values in 1925

Evidence slavery leads to coercive acts

- Can show more localized slavery in 1860 related to:
  - More support for early 20th century Southern state constitutions that created Jim Crow
  - More lynchings per capita during 1882-1930
  - Blacks less likely to own farms, lower farm values in 1925
  - Black-white wage inequality in 1940 (though not an explanation for contemporary attitudes)

Evidence slavery leads to coercive acts

- Can show more localized slavery in 1860 related to:
  - More support for early 20th century Southern state constitutions that created Jim Crow
  - More lynchings per capita during 1882-1930
  - Blacks less likely to own farms, lower farm values in 1925
  - Black-white wage inequality in 1940 (though not an explanation for contemporary attitudes)
  - More Voting Rights Act violations/lower black voter turnout (separate paper)

Evidence slavery leads to coercive acts

- Can show more localized slavery in 1860 related to:
  - More support for early 20th century Southern state constitutions that created Jim Crow
  - More lynchings per capita during 1882-1930
  - Blacks less likely to own farms, lower farm values in 1925
  - Black-white wage inequality in 1940 (though not an explanation for contemporary attitudes)
  - More Voting Rights Act violations/lower black voter turnout (separate paper)
- White elite in the black belt subjugated blacks to maintain their status

Why persistence?

Why persistence?

- Differential black belt political and economic institutions largely erased by CRA, VRA, and mechanization.

Why persistence?

- Differential black belt political and economic institutions largely erased by CRA, VRA, and mechanization.
- Why do we still these relationships today? Intergenerational socialization.

Why persistence?

- Differential black belt political and economic institutions largely erased by CRA, VRA, and mechanization.
- Why do we still these relationships today? Intergenerational socialization.
- Vertical transmission: parent-to-child.

Why persistence?

- Differential black belt political and economic institutions largely erased by CRA, VRA, and mechanization.
- Why do we still these relationships today? Intergenerational socialization.
- Vertical transmission: parent-to-child.
  - Unnamed white woman (1904): "If anything would make me kill my children…it would be the possibility that n*****s might sometimes eat at the same table and associate with them as equals. That's the way we feel about it."

Why persistence?

- Differential black belt political and economic institutions largely erased by CRA, VRA, and mechanization.
- Why do we still these relationships today? Intergenerational socialization.
- Vertical transmission: parent-to-child.
  - Unnamed white woman (1904): "If anything would make me kill my children…it would be the possibility that n*****s might sometimes eat at the same table and associate with them as equals. That's the way we feel about it."
- Horizontal transmission: schools, churches, lynch mobs, etc.

Why persistence?

- Differential black belt political and economic institutions largely erased by CRA, VRA, and mechanization.
- Why do we still these relationships today? Intergenerational socialization.
- Vertical transmission: parent-to-child.
  - Unnamed white woman (1904): "If anything would make me kill my children…it would be the possibility that n*****s might sometimes eat at the same table and associate with them as equals. That's the way we feel about it."
- Horizontal transmission: schools, churches, lynch mobs, etc.
  - Southern history textbooks described slaves as inferior and happy to be mastered

Why persistence?

- Differential black belt political and economic institutions largely erased by CRA, VRA, and mechanization.
- Why do we still these relationships today? Intergenerational socialization.
- Vertical transmission: parent-to-child.
  - Unnamed white woman (1904): "If anything would make me kill my children…it would be the possibility that n*****s might sometimes eat at the same table and associate with them as equals. That's the way we feel about it."
- Horizontal transmission: schools, churches, lynch mobs, etc.
  - Southern history textbooks described slaves as inferior and happy to be mastered
- Transmission most important in areas where the economic/political repression was most needed.

Violence and transmission

Violence and transmission

WARNING: GRAPHIC CONTENT

Violence and transmission

Implication of economic incentive argument

Implication of economic incentive argument

- Suppose postbellum demand for cheap labor drives anti-black attitudes and intergeneration transfer involves some decay

Implication of economic incentive argument

- Suppose postbellum demand for cheap labor drives anti-black attitudes and intergeneration transfer involves some decay
  - $\rightarrow$ areas w/ lower labor demands should see smaller effects

Implication of economic incentive argument

- Suppose postbellum demand for cheap labor drives anti-black attitudes and intergeneration transfer involves some decay
  - $\rightarrow$ areas w/ lower labor demands should see smaller effects
- Partial mechanization of cotton begins in 1920s-30s, leads to lower labor requirements (Alston and Ferrie, 1993)

Implication of economic incentive argument

- Suppose postbellum demand for cheap labor drives anti-black attitudes and intergeneration transfer involves some decay
  - $\rightarrow$ areas w/ lower labor demands should see smaller effects
- Partial mechanization of cotton begins in 1920s-30s, leads to lower labor requirements (Alston and Ferrie, 1993)
- In places that mechanized earlier $\rightarrow$ should see smaller effects

Implication of economic incentive argument

- Suppose postbellum demand for cheap labor drives anti-black attitudes and intergeneration transfer involves some decay
  - $\rightarrow$ areas w/ lower labor demands should see smaller effects
- Partial mechanization of cotton begins in 1920s-30s, leads to lower labor requirements (Alston and Ferrie, 1993)
- In places that mechanized earlier $\rightarrow$ should see smaller effects
  - Exactly what we see empirically.

Mechanization weakens slavery's impact



Mechanization weakens slavery's impact



Mechanization weakens slavery's impact



Empirical conclusions

Empirical conclusions

- Local presence of slavery in 1860 explains some variation in political attitudes within South today

Empirical conclusions

- Local presence of slavery in 1860 explains some variation in political attitudes within South today
- Effects not simply due to antebellum attitudes, geographic sorting, contemporary factors (racial threat)

Empirical conclusions

- Local presence of slavery in 1860 explains some variation in political attitudes within South today
- Effects not simply due to antebellum attitudes, geographic sorting, contemporary factors (racial threat)
- Slavery appears to have direct effect on attitudes today thanks a mix of behavioral and institutional path dependence.

Empirical conclusions

- Local presence of slavery in 1860 explains some variation in political attitudes within South today
- Effects not simply due to antebellum attitudes, geographic sorting, contemporary factors (racial threat)
- Slavery appears to have direct effect on attitudes today thanks a mix of behavioral and institutional path dependence.
- Book project:

Empirical conclusions

- Local presence of slavery in 1860 explains some variation in political attitudes within South today
- Effects not simply due to antebellum attitudes, geographic sorting, contemporary factors (racial threat)
- Slavery appears to have direct effect on attitudes today thanks a mix of behavioral and institutional path dependence.
- Book project:
  - Trace out the relationships from 1830s until today.

Empirical conclusions

- Local presence of slavery in 1860 explains some variation in political attitudes within South today
- Effects not simply due to antebellum attitudes, geographic sorting, contemporary factors (racial threat)
- Slavery appears to have direct effect on attitudes today thanks a mix of behavioral and institutional path dependence.
- Book project:
  - Trace out the relationships from 1830s until today.
  - Show attenuation in institutional relationships, not behavioral ones.

Thanks!

For more information:

- Maya → `http://scholar.harvard.edu/msen`
- Avi → `http://stanford.edu/~avidit/`
- Matt → `http://mattblackwell.org`

Antebellum attitudes?

Antebellum attitudes?

- Political differences between slaveholding and non-slaveholding areas preceded 1860?

Antebellum attitudes?

- Political differences between slaveholding and non-slaveholding areas preceded 1860?
- Racism co-evolved with slavery over time, this passed down

Antebellum attitudes?

- Political differences between slaveholding and non-slaveholding areas preceded 1860?
- Racism co-evolved with slavery over time, this passed down
- Racially hostile attitudes preceded plantation economy, this passed down

Antebellum attitudes?

- Political differences between slaveholding and non-slaveholding areas preceded 1860?
- Racism co-evolved with slavery over time, this passed down
- Racially hostile attitudes preceded plantation economy, this passed down
- Well developed historical literature – Jordan (1968), Foner (2011)

Antebellum attitudes?

- Political differences between slaveholding and non-slaveholding areas preceded 1860?
- Racism co-evolved with slavery over time, this passed down
- Racially hostile attitudes preceded plantation economy, this passed down
- Well developed historical literature – Jordan (1968), Foner (2011)
- For our purposes:

Antebellum attitudes?

- Political differences between slaveholding and non-slaveholding areas preceded 1860?
- Racism co-evolved with slavery over time, this passed down
- Racially hostile attitudes preceded plantation economy, this passed down
- Well developed historical literature – Jordan (1968), Foner (2011)
- For our purposes: Effect of slavery on historical Presidential vote shares

Antebellum attitudes?

- Political differences between slaveholding and non-slaveholding areas preceded 1860?
- Racism co-evolved with slavery over time, this passed down
- Racially hostile attitudes preceded plantation economy, this passed down
- Well developed historical literature – Jordan (1968), Foner (2011)
- For our purposes: Effect of slavery on historical Presidential vote shares $\rightarrow$ suggest post-bellum pattern

Antebellum attitudes?



Antebellum attitudes?



Antebellum attitudes?



Antebellum attitudes?



Antebellum attitudes?



Geographic sorting?

Geographic sorting?

- Possible people moving around over 20th century causes patterns

Geographic sorting?

- Possible people moving around over 20th century causes patterns
- (1) Racially liberal whites leave former slave areas

Geographic sorting?

- Possible people moving around over 20th century causes patterns
- (1) Racially liberal whites leave former slave areas
- (2) Racially conservatives whites move to former slave areas

Geographic sorting?

- Possible people moving around over 20th century causes patterns
- (1) Racially liberal whites leave former slave areas
- (2) Racially conservatives whites move to former slave areas
- Evidence on these points difficult to come by

Evidence from 1940 Census

Evidence from 1940 Census

- 1940 U.S Census recorded county of residence in 1935 and 1940

Evidence from 1940 Census

- 1940 U.S Census recorded county of residence in 1935 and 1940
- Can exploit this to see how white patterns of migration differed between high-slave and low-slave areas

Evidence from 1940 Census

- 1940 U.S Census recorded county of residence in 1935 and 1940
- Can exploit this to see how white patterns of migration differed between high-slave and low-slave areas
- Design from Hornbeck (working paper):

Evidence from 1940 Census

- 1940 U.S Census recorded county of residence in 1935 and 1940
- Can exploit this to see how white patterns of migration differed between high-slave and low-slave areas
- Design from Hornbeck (working paper):
  - Regress census traits on migrant status interacted with proportion slave in 1935 or 1940 county of residence, separately

Evidence from 1940 Census

- 1940 U.S Census recorded county of residence in 1935 and 1940
- Can exploit this to see how white patterns of migration differed between high-slave and low-slave areas
- Design from Hornbeck (working paper):
  - Regress census traits on migrant status interacted with proportion slave in 1935 or 1940 county of residence, separately
  - Are out-migrants different than those they left behind?

Evidence from 1940 Census

- 1940 U.S Census recorded county of residence in 1935 and 1940
- Can exploit this to see how white patterns of migration differed between high-slave and low-slave areas
- Design from Hornbeck (working paper):
  - Regress census traits on migrant status interacted with proportion slave in 1935 or 1940 county of residence, separately
  - Are out-migrants different than those they left behind?
  - Are in-migrants different than those they joined?

Evidence from 1940 Census

- 1940 U.S Census recorded county of residence in 1935 and 1940
- Can exploit this to see how white patterns of migration differed between high-slave and low-slave areas
- Design from Hornbeck (working paper):
  - Regress census traits on migrant status interacted with proportion slave in 1935 or 1940 county of residence, separately
  - Are out-migrants different than those they left behind?
  - Are in-migrants different than those they joined?
  - Do these patterns differ by prop. slave in the county left or joined?

1935-1940 Migration Patterns



1935-1940 Migration Patterns



1935-1940 Migration Patterns



1935-1940 Migration Patterns



Evidence from 1940 Census

Evidence from 1940 Census

- Migrants very different from non-migrants

Evidence from 1940 Census

- Migrants very different from non-migrants
- But: Migration patterns roughly similar across the slavery distribution

Evidence from 1940 Census

- Migrants very different from non-migrants
- But: Migration patterns roughly similar across the slavery distribution
- Some additional evidence from 1995-2000 from 2000 Census

Evidence from 1940 Census

- Migrants very different from non-migrants
- But: Migration patterns roughly similar across the slavery distribution
- Some additional evidence from 1995-2000 from 2000 Census
  - Most migration from (a) low-slave to low-slave areas, (b) high-slave to high-slave areas

Evidence from 1940 Census

- Migrants very different from non-migrants
- But: Migration patterns roughly similar across the slavery distribution
- Some additional evidence from 1995-2000 from 2000 Census
  - Most migration from (a) low-slave to low-slave areas, (b) high-slave to high-slave areas
  - Not across (which would be necessary)

Evidence from 1940 Census

- Migrants very different from non-migrants
- But: Migration patterns roughly similar across the slavery distribution
- Some additional evidence from 1995-2000 from 2000 Census
  - Most migration from (a) low-slave to low-slave areas, (b) high-slave to high-slave areas
  - Not across (which would be necessary)
- $\rightarrow$ Sorting hard to dismiss, but if anything causing classical measurement error

(1) Slavery $\longrightarrow$ Electoral Challenges

(1) Slavery $\longrightarrow$ Electoral Challenges

	Electoral Challenges per 100k Residents	
	(1)	(2)
Prop. Slave, 1860	3.152***	3.158***
	(0.512)	(1.053)
1860 Covariates		✓
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓
Model	OLS	OLS
N	772	434
R^2	0.128	0.149

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

(2) Slavery $\longrightarrow$ Lower Black Voter Turnout

(2) Slavery $\longrightarrow$ Lower Black Voter Turnout

	Turnout	
	Blacks	Whites
Prop. Slave, 1860	−2.901***	−0.064
	(1.121)	(0.353)
1860 Covariates	✓	✓
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓
N	521	4,255
AIC	518.353	4,297.104

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

(3) Slavery $\longrightarrow$ Higher Racial Polarization

(3) Slavery $\longrightarrow$ Higher Racial Polarization

	Democratic Identification	
	Blacks	Whites
Prop. Slave, 1860	0.619	−0.698***
	(0.396)	(0.207)
1860 Covariates	✓	✓
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓
N	5,030	23,714
AIC	4,962.651	29,586.690

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Baseline specification

	Prop. Democrat		Affirm. Action	Racial Resent.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Prop. Slave, 1860	-0.187^{**}	-0.159^{**}	-0.137^{**}	0.554^{**}
	(0.024)	(0.044)	(0.038)	(0.196)
State Fixed Effects		✓	✓	✓
1860 Covariates		✓	✓	✓
N	1,214	748	748	643
R^2	0.046	0.188	0.134	0.114

*p < .05; **p < .01

Baseline specification (individual level)

	Prop Democrat		Affirm. Action		Racial Resentment	
	logistic		logistic		OLS	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Prop. Slave, 1860	−0.698**	−0.672**	−0.627**	−0.572**	0.559**	0.510**
	(0.207)	(0.205)	(0.202)	(0.205)	(0.175)	(0.163)
Constant	19.583	18.586	25.138	23.763	−21.289	−18.042
	(15.941)	(16.043)	(16.871)	(16.726)	(15.641)	(15.312)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Cluster-Robust SEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
1860 Covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Individual Covariates		✓		✓		✓
N	23,714	22,686	23,673	22,645	6,945	6,931
R^2					0.018	0.052

†p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01

Results on Slaveholders

	Prop Democrat		Affirm. Action		Racial Resentment	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Prop. Slave, 1860	−0.163*	−0.175**	−0.104†	−0.150*	0.749**	0.688**
	(0.067)	(0.052)	(0.060)	(0.045)	(0.267)	(0.230)
Prop Slave, 1830	0.041		−0.083		0.032	
	(0.059)		(0.053)		(0.234)	
Prop Slaveholder, 1860		0.991†		0.280		−3.596
		(0.591)		(0.509)		(2.586)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
1860 Covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	456	769	456	769	398	663
R^2	0.236	0.181	0.159	0.125	0.191	0.118

Note: †$p < .1$; *$p < .05$; **$p < .01$. All models are WLS with within-county sample size as weights. Proportion slaveholder is the total slaveholders in a county divided by the total county population.

Instrumental variable results

	Prop Slave	Prop Democrat	Affirm. Action	Racial Resentment
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Cotton Suitability	0.381^{**}			
	(0.027)			
Prop. Slave, 1860		-0.198^{**}	-0.168^{**}	0.512
		(0.075)	(0.063)	(0.360)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Latitude/Longitude	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	$1,206$	$1,206$	$1,206$	$1,016$
R^2	0.447	0.174	0.077	0.045
Model	2SLS 1st Stage	2SLS 2nd Stage	2SLS 2nd Stage	2SLS 2nd Stage

$^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$

Column (1) is 1st stage relationship, Columns (2)-(4) 2nd stage

Does exclusion restriction hold?

- Cotton suitability could affect political beliefs via other mechanisms
- Falsification test (Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011): Exclusion violated if evidence of cotton-attitudes relationship in areas w/no legal slavery
- $\rightarrow$ Examine if effect of IV on attitudes outside South

Falsification test



Falsification test



Falsification test



Falsification test



North-South counterfactual analysis

- Is fact that slavery legal driving effect? Or is localized high/low prevalence driving effect?
- Test to compare:
- Northern counties (slavery illegal by 1860)
- Southern counties w/ very low % enslaved

North-South counterfactual analysis

North-South counterfactual analysis

North-South counterfactual analysis



North-South counterfactual analysis

if different, then legality of institution driving the difference

North-South counterfactual analysis

- Match Southern counties w/ few slaves ($<$ 3% of the pop) to Northern counties w/ no slaves on
  - geography (latitude/longitude/area)
  - farm value per capita, and
  - total county population
- Use coarsened exact matching w/ default cut-points
- 181 matched counties left
- Regress each outcome measure on North-South dummy

North-South counterfactual analysis



North-South counterfactual analysis



Other political attitudes



Other political attitudes



Test of racial threat

- Sequential g-estimation procedure (Vansteelandt, 2009):
  1. Regress attitudes on % black today, % slave 1860, and any confounders for % black today

$$Y_c = \alpha_s + \beta_1 PB_{c,2000} + \beta_2 PS_{c,1860} + X_c \beta_3 + \varepsilon_c$$

  2. Adjust outcome by subtracting estimated effect of % black

$$\tilde{Y}_c = Y_c - \hat{\beta}_1 PB_{c,2000}$$

  3. Regress adjusted outcome on % slave without any post-treatment variables

$$\tilde{Y}_c = \alpha_s + \gamma_1 PS_{c,1860} + X_{c,1860} \gamma_2 + \nu_c$$

- Under no omitted variables at each stage (and homogeneous effects), γ_2 is controlled direct effect of slavery.

Racial threat results

	Prop. Democrat		Affirm. Action		Racial Resentment	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Prop. Slave, Direct Effect	-0.175^{**}	-0.159^{**}	-0.143^{**}	-0.129^{**}	0.571^{**}	0.541^{**}
	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.196)	(0.196)
Prop. Black, 2000	0.167^{**}		0.054		-0.241	
	(0.049)		(0.043)		(0.214)	
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
1860 Covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	748	748	748	748	643	643
R^2	0.200	0.187	0.136	0.118	0.116	0.111
Model	WLS	Seq. g-est.	WLS	Seq. g-est.	WLS	Seq. g-est.

$^{**}p < .05$; $^{***}p < .01$

Columns (1), (3), and (5) include % black 2000 as an additional control to the baseline specification. Columns (2), (4), and (6) use sequential g-estimation of Vansteelandt (2009).

Antebellum attitudes

	Prop Democrat		Affirm. Action		Racial Resentment	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Prop. Slave, 1860	$-0.198^{\dagger}$	-0.186^{**}	-0.096	-0.152^{**}	1.916^{**}	0.753^{**}
	(0.116)	(0.052)	(0.102)	(0.045)	(0.481)	(0.229)
Prop. Slave, 1850	0.024		-0.163		-0.118	
	(0.115)		(0.101)		(0.452)	
Prop Slave 1840	0.048		0.100		-0.985^{*}	
	(0.113)		(0.099)		(0.455)	
Prop Slaveholder, 1860		0.557		0.307		$-4.253^{\dagger}$
		(0.576)		(0.495)		(2.545)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
1860 Covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	566	748	566	748	489	643
R^2	0.213	0.189	0.148	0.135	0.162	0.118

$^{\dagger}p < .1$; $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$

Children of immigrants

	Prop Democrat		Affirm. Action		Racial Resentment	
	logistic		logistic		OLS	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Prop. Slave, 1860	0.619	−0.714	−0.630	−0.646	−0.092	0.694
	(0.396)	(0.533)	(0.462)	(0.502)	(0.411)	(0.581)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
1860 Covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Cluster-Robust SEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Sample	Blacks	2nd Gen. Immigrants	Blacks	2nd Gen. Immigrants	Blacks	2nd Gen. Immigrants
N	5,030	1,886	5,025	1,881	1,634	580

*p < .1; **p < .05

Effect of slavery on African Americans (Columns 1, 3, and 5) and children of immigrants (Columns 2, 4, 6) in South

Urban-Rural/Civil War Destruction

	Prop Democrat		Affirm. Action		Racial Resentment	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Prop. Slave, 1860	−0.196**	−0.165**	−0.157**	−0.143**	0.487†	0.571***
	(0.057)	(0.044)	(0.049)	(0.038)	(0.251)	(0.196)
Civil War Destruction		−0.005		−0.005		0.056
		(0.008)		(0.007)		(0.050)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
1860 Covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Rural Counties Only	✓		✓		✓	
N	565	747	565	747	471	642
R^2	0.168	0.191	0.156	0.140	0.125	0.121

†p < .1;*p < .05; **p < .01

Effect of slavery after eliminating large urban centers (Columns 1, 3, 5) and controlling for Civil War destruction (Columns 2, 4, 6), which are % decrease in farm value in county between 1860 and 1870)

Postbellum patterns

	Lynchings	Prop Democrat	Affirm. Action	Racial Resentment
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Prop. Slave, 1860	16.618**	−0.235**	−0.213**	0.829**
	(4.537)	(0.053)	(0.045)	(0.235)
Tractors Change, 1930-1940		−0.483†	−0.616†	2.198†
		(0.289)	(0.248)	(1.264)
Tractors, 1930		−0.197	−0.112	0.191
		(0.179)	(0.154)	(0.777)
Prop Slave × Tractors Change		2.303*	2.179**	−9.094*
		(0.942)	(0.809)	(4.229)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
1860 Covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	748	748	748	643
R^2	0.371	0.197	0.145	0.121
Specification	WLS-county area	WLS-sample size	WLS-sample size	WLS-sample size

†p < .1;*p < .05; **p < .01

Black lynchings per 100,000 blacks 1882–1930, number of tractors per 100,000 acres of land in 1940. Column 1 is WLS w/ log of total county area as weights.

References I

Alesina, Alberto and Nicola Fuchs-Schundeln. 2007. "Goodbye Lenin (or Not?): The Effect of Communism on People." American Economic Review 97(4):1507–1528.

Alesina, Alberto, Paola Giuliano and Nathan Nunn. 2013. "On the Origins of Gender Roles: Women and the Plough." Quarterly Journal of Economics 128(2):469–530.

Campante, Filipe and David Yanagizawa-Drott. 2015. "The Intergenerational Transmission of War." Harvard Kennedy School, Working Paper.

Dhar, Diva, Tarun Jain and Seema Jayachandran. 2014. "The Intergenerational Transmission of Gender Attitudes: Evidence from India." Northwestern University, Working Paper.

Foner, Eric. 2011. Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877. Harper and Row.

References II

Jennings, M. Kent and Richard Niemi. 1974. The Political Character of Adolescents. Princeton University Press.

Jordan, Winthrop D. 1968. White Over Black: American Attitudes Toward the Negro, 1550-1812. University of North Carolina Press.

Nunn, Nathan and Leonard Wantchekon. 2011. "The Slave Trade and the Origins of Mistrust in Africa." American Economic Review 101(7):3221–3252.

Vansteelandt, Sijn. 2009. "Estimating Direct Effects in Cohort and Case–Control Studies." Epidemiology 20(6):851–860.

Voigtländer, Nico and Hans-Joachim Voth. 2012. "Persecution Perpetuated: The Medieval Origins of Anti-Semitic Violence in Nazi Germany." Quarterly Journal of Economics 127(3):1339–1392.